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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1893 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
FRANCISCO ALFARO 
aka Robby Vazquez 
 
Francisco Alfaro, 
                                Appellant  
     
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 11-cr-00835-001 ) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 8, 2013 
____________ 
 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and BARRY Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 30, 2013 ) 
____________ 
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____________ 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 In this appeal, Francisco Alfaro challenges the reasonableness and procedural 
soundness of a two-year term of supervised release the District Court imposed as part of 
Alfaro’s sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
I.  
 On December 7, 2011, Alfaro, a citizen of Costa Rica, pleaded guilty to willfully 
and knowingly making a false statement in a passport application in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1542 in the District of New Jersey. On March 12, 2012, Alfaro was sentenced to 
time-served, which totaled around twenty months, though the guidelines range was only 
one to seven months.  
 The court also imposed a term of two years of supervised release and a special 
condition as part of that supervised release term: that Alfaro cooperate with U.S. 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). As part of this condition, the District 
Court required that, “[i]f deported, [Alfaro] shall not re-enter the United States without 
written permission of the Attorney General. If [Alfaro] re-enter[s] the United States, [he 
is to] report in person to the nearest U.S. Probation Office within 48 hours.” App. at 8. 
 The Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), prepared by the U.S. Probation Office, stated 
that the “the Court may impose a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years. 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2)” and that “[t]he guideline range for a term of supervised release is at 
least 1 but not more than 3 years, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(b). Supervised release is 
required if the Court imposes a term of imprisonment of more than one year, unless a 
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departure is granted in accordance with the Application Notes of U.S.S.G. §§ 5D1.1 and 
5D1.2.” The PSR did not mention U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) which provides that “[t]he court 
ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case in which supervised 
release is not required by statute and the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will 
be deported after imprisonment.” Application Note 5 further explains the import of this 
subsection:  
In a case in which the defendant is a deportable alien specified in 
subsection (c) and supervised release is not required by statute, the court 
ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release. Unless such a 
defendant legally returns to the United States, supervised release is 
unnecessary. If such a defendant illegally returns to the United States, the 
need to afford adequate deterrence and protect the public ordinarily is 
adequately served by a new prosecution. The court should, however, 
consider imposing a term of supervised release on such a defendant if the 
court determines it would provide an added measure of deterrence and 
protection based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1, cmt. n. 5. At sentencing no one discussed U.S.S.G. §  5D1.1(c). 
 The District Court gave the following explanation for the sentence it imposed:  
I did … read the presentence report and certainly understand where Mr. 
Alfaro falls under the Sentencing Guidelines. I also understand that I’m not 
bound by the Guidelines, and I have used them only in an advisory 
capacity. But the sentence that I impose is one I feel is appropriate within 
my discretion. He has a criminal history category of 2, and he has a total 
offense level of 6. I would note that under the 3553(a) factors, a sentence 
that should be imposed is one that in fact promotes respect for the law and 
also provides just punishment for the activity engaged in by Mr. Alfaro, and 
hopefully deter[s] not only Mr. Alfaro, but others that are contemplating 
engaging in activity of this nature, specifically reentering this country when 
they have in fact—they are not a citizen here.  
 
In addition to that, I’m satisfied that the sentence I impose will be one 
which does not create any unwarranted sentencing disparities, but will be 
keeping with what is appropriate under all of the circumstances.  [App. at 
56.] 
 4 
 
 
 
 Before imposing sentence, the District Court questioned the parties regarding 
whether an ICE detainer had already been lodged against Alfaro, and when it was 
determined that the answer to this question was not clear, the District Court held Alfaro 
for an additional 24 hours so that ICE could handle administrative issues. Alfaro did not 
take exception to any portion of the PSR nor did Alfaro make any objections at the 
sentencing hearing. 
 After sentencing, Alfaro filed a pro se notice of appeal, and on September 25, 
2012, he was removed to Costa Rica.    
II. 
Before addressing the merits, the Court must address the government’s argument 
that this case is now moot given Alfaro’s removal to Costa Rica, as this question 
implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.1 See United States v. 
Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We are required to confront a question about 
our jurisdiction before we can proceed to the [merits of appellant’s claim].”); see also 
United States v. Huff, 703 F.3d 609, 611 (3d Cir. 2013).  
We ordinarily presume that a defendant who is serving a term of supervised 
release has a live “case or controversy” sufficient to a hear a challenge to the imposition 
of the supervised release term. See United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 
2008). The question here, however, is whether Alfaro’s removal to Costa Rica mooted his 
                                                          
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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appeal given that many of the practical restraints of supervised release no longer apply to 
him. The United States, as the party “arguing that [the] case is moot[,] must bear a heavy 
burden of demonstrating the facts underlying that contention.” In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 
366 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the government simply 
argues that Alfaro “would only be affected by the terms of [his] supervised release if he 
illegally returns to this country before the expiration of his supervised release in March 
2014.” Gov’t Br. at 9 (emphasis added). Even if we were to agree with the government’s 
legal premise, the government has not described the facts that would make it unlikely that 
Alfaro could obtain permission to reenter the U.S. legally before the end of his release 
term. In short, the government has failed to meet its burden that the case is moot. Thus 
we conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to hear Alfaro’s appeal.  
III. 
Satisfied that we have jurisdiction, we now turn to the merits of Alfaro’s appeal. 
The government argues that plain error review applies because at no point did Alfaro 
object to either the PSR recommending a supervised release term of one to three years or 
the imposition of the supervised release term at his sentencing. The sentencing record 
confirms that Alfaro raised no objections, and the government is indeed correct that plain 
error review therefore applies. United States v. Berger, 689 F.3d 297, 299 (3d Cir. 2012). 
Under this standard, “[w]e may … set aside [Alfaro’s] sentence only if: (1) the District 
Court erred; (2) the court’s error was clear or obvious; (3) [Alfaro] can show that the 
error affected his substantial rights, i.e., that it prejudiced him; and (4) not correcting the 
error would seriously impair the fairness, integrity, or reputation of a judicial 
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proceeding.” United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 467, 469 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 
Berger, 689 F.3d at 299 (quoting same).  
Our review of whether a District Court erred in imposing a sentence upon a 
criminal defendant is twofold. First, we consider whether the sentencing court committed 
any procedural errors “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 
explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the 
Guidelines range.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Second, if the District Court 
committed no procedural error, we consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness. A 
sentence is substantively unreasonable only if “no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
Alfaro objects to the procedures used by the District Court in exercising its 
discretion. Sentencing courts shall consider “the factors set forth in [§] 3553(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)” in determining whether to 
 7 
 
impose a term of supervised release and its length. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c).
2
 Alfaro argues 
that the District Court failed to address the § 3553(a) factors when it imposed a term of 
supervised release. We agree with Alfaro only in part. The record below contains no 
mention of U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), which disfavors the use of supervised release for 
defendants who are likely to be removed after serving a term of imprisonment.  
We need not decide whether there was an error because Alfaro failed to bring this 
potential error to the District Court’s attention at any point, and he cannot satisfy his 
burden to show that it was clear or obvious, that it prejudiced him, and that failing to 
correct the error would “impair the fairness, integrity, or reputation of a judicial 
proceeding.” Reynoso, 254 F.3d at 469. Because the District Court was within its right to 
impose a term of supervised release under § 5D1.1, any potential error was not plain. See 
United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 107 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding “there was no plain 
error because the 5-year supervised release term was clearly within the range that the 
court was authorized to impose” even though the district court erroneously thought there 
was a five-year, rather than three-year, minimum of supervised release); see contra, 
United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Having decided today that the 
tolling of Cole’s period of supervised release during his time of exclusion from the 
United States was unlawful [and prejudiced him], we would be casting doubt on the 
                                                          
2
 Section 3553(a)(1) refers to “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant”, (a)(2) refers to “the need for the sentence imposed … (B) to 
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of 
the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”, (a)(4) refers to the 
applicable guidelines range, (a)(5) refers to any pertinent policy statements issued by the 
sentencing commission, and (a)(6) refers to the need to avoid sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(a)(2)(D),(a)(4)-(a)(6). 
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fairness, integrity, and reputation of our proceedings if we were to allow tolling without 
statutory authorization.”). 
Having reviewed Alfaro’s remaining challenges to the substantive and procedural 
reasonableness of his supervised release term under the legal frameworks set forth above, 
we conclude these arguments are without merit. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence of supervised release imposed 
by the District Court.  
